The reach of Cuban diplomacy in today’s Middle East transcends
Havana’s historic alliances with fellow archenemies of the United States
and the West. Since Fidel Castro’s first foray into Middle Eastern
affairs in the early 1960s (1), an eclectic array of anti-American
regimes from North Africa to the Persian Gulf, among them Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq, Qaddafi’s Libya, and the Iran of the Ayatollahs, have all found a
friend in Castro’s Cuba.
The island’s longstanding political alignment with Iran, for
instance, has expanded into a billion-dollar financial lifeline from
Tehran to Havana. (2) Yet, the best measure of Havana’s recent
diplomatic triumphs in the region lies in its rising profile as a
pragmatic geostrategic partner and safe haven for Islamic interests in
the Western hemisphere. The fact that even allies of the U.S., including
the moderate Persian Gulf states of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,
are investing in Cuba and collaborating with the government of General
Raúl Castro is itself indicative of the Cuban regime’s remarkable
ability to continue to circumvent and outmaneuver Washington around the
world.
Qatar
In April 2008, Qatar’s real estate development fund Qatari Diar
announced that it will invest $70 million in a joint venture with Cuba’s
state-run Gran Caribe hotel group to build a 200-room five-star hotel
and an accompanying 60 luxury villas on Cayo Largo, an exclusive island
resort off the Cuban mainland. (3) The commitment of Qatari capital in
Cuba is the culmination of many years of political courting by Fidel
Castro, who in September 2000 bestowed Cuba’s highest honor, the Order
of José Martí, on Qatar’s ruling emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani.
At $70 million, the investment by Qatar surpasses in value the declining
number of new business deals with Spain and other European nations,
which have dominated Cuba’s hospitality sector since the Castro regime
opened the island to foreign investment in the early 1990s. Moreover,
such a large infusion of capital by Qatari Diar, a government-funded
subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority, suggests a high degree of
trust in the stability of the Castro regime as well as confidence in the
longer-term economic value of the island.
Indeed, Qatar has also signed an accord with Havana for the
services of Cuban public health professionals to establish and operate a
new comprehensive hospital, staffed and supervised by Cuban physicians
and specialists, in the Qatari town of Dukhan. (4) While the details of
the deal have not been released, the contract with the wealthy Gulf
emirate will undoubtedly generate a substantial stream of hard-currency
revenue for the Cuban government. Qatar is a potentially very lucrative
market for the export of Cuban medical services as Havana increasingly
relies on hiring out physicians and other highly-skilled Cuban workers
to developing countries in order to compensate for the low productivity
of the Cuban economy. (5)
OPEC Fund
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has
emerged as one of the island’s largest aid donors since 2003, when Cuba
ended all official cooperation with the European Union (EU) and rejected
further bilateral assistance from most EU member states. Through the
Vienna-based OPEC Fund for International Development, the oil cartel has
funneled more than $50 million in low-interest development loans to the
Cuban government for major investments in electrical infrastructure,
water sanitation, and agricultural production. (6) And unlike the aid
provided by European and other Western governments, which publicly
reprimanded the Castro regime following the widespread repression of
Cuban dissidents in 2003, the OPEC Fund does not exert any pressure on
Cuba to democratize its political system or liberalize its economy.
It is undoubtedly for this reason, as well as for the magnitude
of the aid itself, that Cuban vice president Carlos Lage has praised the
OPEC Fund as “one of the few institutions left in the world that offer[s]
such concessional and untied aid,” (7) i.e., with no reform conditions
attached. Considering that grants and other assistance from Spain, the
island’s leading European investor which at times has sought to use its
economic presence as leverage to influence the direction of a post-Fidel
Cuba, totaled 44 million euros (about US$56 million) over a three-year
period from 2004 through 2006 (8), aid from the OPEC Fund and other
alternative sources has enabled the Cuban government to break its
post-Soviet dependency on Western donors and in the process largely
nullify Spanish and EU political pressure on the Castro regime,
especially at times of crisis.
Dubai Ports: Mariel v. Miami
After Congress forced the United Arab Emirates-based Dubai Ports
World (DP World) to sell its operations at six U.S. ports, including New
York and Miami, to a U.S. company in response to the perceived security
implications of an Islamic firm running major American ports, the Dubai-owned
marine terminal operator found an alternative to Miami in the Cuban
seaport of Mariel. In what may be the single most ambitious foreign
financed project in Cuba since the collapse of the Soviet Union, DP
World, which is backed by the sovereign wealth fund of the emirate of
Dubai, revealed in October 2007 that it will commit some US$250 million
in a joint venture with the Cuban government to transform Mariel, about
30 miles to the west of Havana, into a world-class transshipment center.
The flow of Arab capital into an undervalued but strategic asset like
Mariel could transform Cuba once again into a major entrepôt at the
crossroads of the global economy.
A prescient analysis in The
Economist argues that by the time DP World completes its
planned modernization and expansion of the Cuban port’s facilities in
2012, “Mariel…would be a well-positioned hub” with the potential to
compete for international business. (9) East Asian container lines (DP
World, currently the third largest international shipping terminal
operator, manages several ports in China) might be willing to reroute
their vessels via Cuba for both economic and political reasons. How?
Assuming that Washington’s trade sanctions against Cuba have been lifted
or relaxed sufficiently so as to allow merchandise imports from the
island to enter the U.S. market, by the end of the next administration
in the White House both Cuban and multinational “goods could be
transferred from the big container ships arriving at the port to smaller
vessels which could then reach dozens of harbours in the southern United
States.” (10) The possibility that a DP World-run Mariel could
eventually challenge Miami’s dominance as the preferred commercial port
along the Florida Straits has already been acknowledged by the current
director of the Port of Miami with “great concern” at what lies “right
around the corner” in 2012. (11)
Cuba, 2012: Islamic Island?
It is not likely that a substantial segment of the island’s
population will convert to Islam in the near future or that the
fundamentally secular nature of Cuban society will be altered by recent
contacts with the Muslim cultures. Nevertheless, the emerging economic
ties with Islamic nations do suggest that Cuba is seen as a secure and
stable country for Islamic capital and as a reliable political partner
to Islamic regimes.
The immediate concerns of most Western observers with respect to
Cuba, particularly in light of the catastrophic costs to the island’s
economy and infrastructure by hurricanes of recent memory, tend to be
short-sighted. While the danger of short-term social upheaval must
always be taken into account, it is unlikely that Havana’s allies will
allow the strategically located island to sink into chaos simply for a
lack of resources, which they are able and willing to provide as a long-term
investment in Raúl’s regime. Instead of short-term apocalyptic fears,
Islamic investors have demonstrated confidence in Raúl’s vision of a
Beijing in the tropics.
By 2012, the island could very well become a leading financial
and logistics center for Islamic firms seeking proximity to the United
States while remaining beyond the reach of Washington’s policies and
regulations. Only Cuba could offer such a safe haven for Islamic capital
and interests.
_________________________________________________
Notes
(1) Cf. Piero Gleijeses, “Cuba’s First Venture in Africa: Algeria,
1961-1965,” Journal of Latin
American Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb. 1996), pp.
159-195.
(2) See “Islamic Investment in Cuba,”
Cuba Focus, August 11,
2008,
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue99.htm.
(3) Amy Glass, “Qatar to build $70 mn Cuba resort,” ArabianBusiness.com,
April 29, 2008,
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/517917-qatar-investment-authority-signed-70mln-deal-with-cuban-republic
(accessed September 2008).
(4) “Qatar, Cuba sign deal on medical services,” Doha,
The Peninsula, April 23,
2008.
(5) Cf. Marc Frank, “Cuban service exports continue dramatic rise,”
Havana, Reuters, January 10, 2008,
http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINN1016624020080110.
(6) Cf. OPEC Fund for International Development, “Country Profiles,
Cuba,”
http://www.ofid.org/projects_operations/latamerica/cuba.html, (accessed
September 2008).
(7) OPEC Fund for International Development, “Cuban Vice-President
visits OFID,” Press release, Vienna, May 17, 2006.
(8) “España reactiva la
cooperación con Cuba,” El Mundo
(Spain), September 30, 2007. The approximate value of euros to
U.S. dollars is based on October 2006 exchange rates.
(9) “Foreign investment in Cuba: Bye-bye embargo?”
The Economist, November 22,
2007.
(10) Ibid.
(11) “Port Director Expresses Concern Over Cuba’s Mariel,” Miami, Local
10.com, April 14, 2008,
http://www.local10.com/news/15875315/detail.html.
_________________________________________________
*
Hans de Salas del Valle is a Research Associate, Cuba Transition
Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of
Miami.
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An Information Service of
the
Cuba Transition
Project
Institute for Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies
University of Miami
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Issue 102 |
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October 6, 2008 |
Hans de Salas-del Valle* |
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Islamic Investment in Cuba: Part II |
The reach of Cuban diplomacy in today’s Middle East
transcends Havana’s historic alliances with fellow archenemies
of the United States and the West. Since Fidel Castro’s first
foray into Middle Eastern affairs in the early 1960s (1), an
eclectic array of anti-American regimes from North Africa to the
Persian Gulf, among them Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Qaddafi’s Libya,
and the Iran of the Ayatollahs, have all found a friend in
Castro’s Cuba.
The island’s longstanding
political alignment with Iran, for instance, has expanded into a
billion-dollar financial lifeline from Tehran to Havana. (2) Yet,
the best measure of Havana’s recent diplomatic triumphs in the
region lies in its rising profile as a pragmatic geostrategic
partner and safe haven for Islamic interests in the Western
hemisphere. The fact that even allies of the U.S., including the
moderate Persian Gulf states of Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates, are investing in Cuba and collaborating with the
government of General Raúl Castro is itself indicative of the
Cuban regime’s remarkable ability to continue to circumvent and
outmaneuver Washington around the world.
Qatar
In April 2008, Qatar’s real
estate development fund Qatari Diar announced that it will
invest $70 million in a joint venture with Cuba’s state-run Gran
Caribe hotel group to build a 200-room five-star hotel and an
accompanying 60 luxury villas on Cayo Largo, an exclusive island
resort off the Cuban mainland. (3) The commitment of Qatari
capital in Cuba is the culmination of many years of political
courting by Fidel Castro, who in September 2000 bestowed Cuba’s
highest honor, the Order of José Martí, on Qatar’s ruling emir
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. At $70 million, the
investment by Qatar surpasses in value the declining number of
new business deals with Spain and other European nations, which
have dominated Cuba’s hospitality sector since the Castro regime
opened the island to foreign investment in the early 1990s.
Moreover, such a large infusion of capital by Qatari Diar, a
government-funded subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority,
suggests a high degree of trust in the stability of the Castro
regime as well as confidence in the longer-term economic value
of the island.
Indeed, Qatar has also
signed an accord with Havana for the services of Cuban public
health professionals to establish and operate a new
comprehensive hospital, staffed and supervised by Cuban
physicians and specialists, in the Qatari town of Dukhan. (4)
While the details of the deal have not been released, the
contract with the wealthy Gulf emirate will undoubtedly generate
a substantial stream of hard-currency revenue for the Cuban
government. Qatar is a potentially very lucrative market for the
export of Cuban medical services as Havana increasingly relies
on hiring out physicians and other highly-skilled Cuban workers
to developing countries in order to compensate for the low
productivity of the Cuban economy. (5)
OPEC Fund
The Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has emerged as one of the
island’s largest aid donors since 2003, when Cuba ended all
official cooperation with the European Union (EU) and rejected
further bilateral assistance from most EU member states. Through
the Vienna-based OPEC Fund for International Development, the
oil cartel has funneled more than $50 million in low-interest
development loans to the Cuban government for major investments
in electrical infrastructure, water sanitation, and agricultural
production. (6) And unlike the aid provided by European and
other Western governments, which publicly reprimanded the Castro
regime following the widespread repression of Cuban dissidents
in 2003, the OPEC Fund does not exert any pressure on Cuba to
democratize its political system or liberalize its economy.
It is undoubtedly for this
reason, as well as for the magnitude of the aid itself, that
Cuban vice president Carlos Lage has praised the OPEC Fund as
“one of the few institutions left in the world that offer[s]
such concessional and untied aid,” (7) i.e., with no reform
conditions attached. Considering that grants and other
assistance from Spain, the island’s leading European investor
which at times has sought to use its economic presence as
leverage to influence the direction of a post-Fidel Cuba,
totaled 44 million euros (about US$56 million) over a three-year
period from 2004 through 2006 (8), aid from the OPEC Fund and
other alternative sources has enabled the Cuban government to
break its post-Soviet dependency on Western donors and in the
process largely nullify Spanish and EU political pressure on the
Castro regime, especially at times of crisis.
Dubai Ports: Mariel v.
Miami
After Congress forced the
United Arab Emirates-based Dubai Ports World (DP World) to sell
its operations at six U.S. ports, including New York and Miami,
to a U.S. company in response to the perceived security
implications of an Islamic firm running major American ports,
the Dubai-owned marine terminal operator found an alternative to
Miami in the Cuban seaport of Mariel. In what may be the single
most ambitious foreign financed project in Cuba since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, DP World, which is backed by the
sovereign wealth fund of the emirate of Dubai, revealed in
October 2007 that it will commit some US$250 million in a joint
venture with the Cuban government to transform Mariel, about 30
miles to the west of Havana, into a world-class transshipment
center. The flow of Arab capital into an undervalued but
strategic asset like Mariel could transform Cuba once again into
a major entrepôt at the crossroads of the global economy.
A prescient analysis in
The Economist
argues that by the time DP World completes its planned
modernization and expansion of the Cuban port’s facilities in
2012, “Mariel…would be a well-positioned hub” with the potential
to compete for international business. (9) East Asian container
lines (DP World, currently the third largest international
shipping terminal operator, manages several ports in China)
might be willing to reroute their vessels via Cuba for both
economic and political reasons. How? Assuming that Washington’s
trade sanctions against Cuba have been lifted or relaxed
sufficiently so as to allow merchandise imports from the island
to enter the U.S. market, by the end of the next administration
in the White House both Cuban and multinational “goods could be
transferred from the big container ships arriving at the port to
smaller vessels which could then reach dozens of harbours in the
southern United States.” (10) The possibility that a DP World-run
Mariel could eventually challenge Miami’s dominance as the
preferred commercial port along the Florida Straits has already
been acknowledged by the current director of the Port of Miami
with “great concern” at what lies “right around the corner” in
2012. (11)
Cuba, 2012: Islamic
Island?
It is not likely that a
substantial segment of the island’s population will convert to
Islam in the near future or that the fundamentally secular
nature of Cuban society will be altered by recent contacts with
the Muslim cultures. Nevertheless, the emerging economic ties
with Islamic nations do suggest that Cuba is seen as a secure
and stable country for Islamic capital and as a reliable
political partner to Islamic regimes.
The immediate concerns of
most Western observers with respect to Cuba, particularly in
light of the catastrophic costs to the island’s economy and
infrastructure by hurricanes of recent memory, tend to be short-sighted.
While the danger of short-term social upheaval must always be
taken into account, it is unlikely that Havana’s allies will
allow the strategically located island to sink into chaos simply
for a lack of resources, which they are able and willing to
provide as a long-term investment in Raúl’s regime. Instead of
short-term apocalyptic fears, Islamic investors have
demonstrated confidence in Raúl’s vision of a Beijing in the
tropics.
By 2012, the island could
very well become a leading financial and logistics center for
Islamic firms seeking proximity to the United States while
remaining beyond the reach of Washington’s policies and
regulations. Only Cuba could offer such a safe haven for Islamic
capital and interests.
_________________________________________________
Notes
(1) Cf. Piero Gleijeses, “Cuba’s
First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965,”
Journal of Latin American Studies,
Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb. 1996), pp. 159-195.
(2) See “Islamic Investment in
Cuba,” Cuba Focus,
August 11, 2008,
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue99.htm.
(3) Amy Glass, “Qatar to build $70
mn Cuba resort,” ArabianBusiness.com, April 29, 2008,
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/517917-qatar-investment-authority-signed-70mln-deal-with-cuban-republic
(accessed September 2008).
(4) “Qatar, Cuba sign deal on
medical services,” Doha, The
Peninsula, April 23, 2008.
(5) Cf. Marc Frank, “Cuban service
exports continue dramatic rise,” Havana, Reuters, January 10,
2008,
http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINN1016624020080110.
(6) Cf. OPEC Fund for
International Development, “Country Profiles, Cuba,”
http://www.ofid.org/projects_operations/latamerica/cuba.html,
(accessed September 2008).
(7) OPEC Fund for International
Development, “Cuban Vice-President visits OFID,” Press release,
Vienna, May 17, 2006.
(8) “España reactiva la
cooperación con Cuba,” El
Mundo (Spain), September 30, 2007. The
approximate value of euros to U.S. dollars is based on October
2006 exchange rates.
(9) “Foreign investment in Cuba:
Bye-bye embargo?” The
Economist, November 22, 2007.
(10) Ibid.
(11) “Port Director Expresses
Concern Over Cuba’s Mariel,” Miami, Local 10.com, April 14,
2008,
http://www.local10.com/news/15875315/detail.html.
_________________________________________________
* Hans de Salas del Valle is a
Research Associate, Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban
and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami.
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